



0. Introduction

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER



1. The Meaning and Use of "*Aretē*"

- The lexical/literal meaning of "*aretē*" is goodness.
- Cp. "*agathosynē*" and "*esthlotēs*," both are rare and late; "*spoudaiotēs*" is also rare and has a much narrower meaning; likewise, "*chrēstotēs*."



- From the fourth century, "*aretē*" is frequently used to denote virtue, but it does not itself mean virtue.



- 1a. This pizza is good.
- 1b. This pizza is tasty/delicious.
- 1c. This pizza is good in the salient way that pizza is good.
- 1d. This pizza is pizza-wise good.

- "good" + adverbial denotes a kind of goodness.
- "human *aretē*," "psychological *aretē*," "*aretē* of the soul," "*aretē* of character"
- "*aretē*" + adjectival denotes a kind of *aretē*.

2. Goodness and Value

- 2a. This article isn't just good, it's excellent.
- 2b. This proposal is good, but it's not excellent.

- 3a. This department store isn't just large, it's enormous.
 3b. This house is large, but it's not enormous.



- *aretē* = goodness = significant value.

3. Value and Purposiveness

- value = purposiveness.
 - "purpose" is two-ways ambiguous between motivational and functional senses.
- 4a. Adam has been working overtime; his purpose is to save enough money to buy a summer house.
 4b. Adam has been working overtime; his goal/intention/aim is to save enough money to buy a ...
- 5a. The purpose of a clock is to keep time.
 5b. What is the purpose of the Golgi apparatus?

- value = the property of serving a (functional) purpose = (functional) purpose-serving-ness.
- goodness = significant value = significant (functional) purposiveness.

4. Plato's Theory of Universal *Aretē*

"For the goodness (*to agathon*) or well faring (*to eu*) of a flute-player or sculptor or craftsman of any sort, and on the whole whatever has some function/purpose (*ergon*) or activity (*pragma*), seems to lie in that function/purpose (*ergon*). And so, it would seem in the case of a human being, if in fact there is some function/purpose of a human being." (*EN* 1.7, 1097b25-28)

"Concerning *aretē*, let it be assumed that it is the best condition (*diathesis*), *hexis*, or power (*dynamis*) of each of the things that has a use (*chrēsis*) or function/purpose (*ergon*)." (*EE* 2.2, 1218b37-1291a1)

[fn. 12: Note that neither "goodness" nor "excellence" denotes a superlative amount of value. So, neither is synonymous with "optimality" or what "best-ness" would mean if it existed. Having just said, I must unfortunately say that the Greek philosophers tend to conflate *aretē*, that is, goodness with optimality. (E.g., cp. *EE*. 2.2, 1218b37-1219a1, cited below; *MM* 1.11, 1182b7-8.) But that shouldn't trouble us here. The quantity of value that "*aretē*" denotes will not be so important in the following discussion.]

PLATO'S FUNCTION ARGUMENT AT R. 352d8-354a5

- i. For any type of thing *T* that has an *ergon* (purpose/function), the *ergon* of *T* is:
 - i. what *T* alone can do or
 - ii. what *T* can do most effectively in comparison to any other type of thing.
- ii. For an *ergon*-possessing *T* to perform its *ergon* effectively, that *T* must have the relevant *aretē*.
- iiia. E.g., a pruning knife has an *ergon*, namely, to play a particular role in pruning vines; so, for a pruning knife to perform its *ergon* effectively, it must have the relevant *aretē*, namely, a sharp blade, durability, etc.
- iiib. E.g., the eye has an *ergon*, namely, to see; so, for an eye to perform its *ergon* effectively, it must have the relevant *aretē*.
- iii. There is an *ergon* of the *psychē* (soul), namely, living a certain kind of life.
- iv. In the case of the human *psychē*, this *ergon* involves practical reasoning, inter alia.
- v. The human *psychē* requires the relevant *aretē* to perform its *ergon*.
- vi. The *aretē* of the human *psychē* is justness (*dikaiosynē*).
- vii. So, justness, this *aretē*, enables the human *psychē* to perform its *ergon* effectively.
- viii. Effective performance of the *ergon* of the human *psychē* is *eudaimonia*.
- ix. Therefore, the just (*dikaios*) person is *eudaimōn*.

- Plato recognizes an important connection between goodness and function or purpose, namely:

For a good *T*, the goodness of that *T* is that property of *T* that enables it to perform its function or purpose effectively.

5. Plato's Stative Potentiality Restriction on *Aretē*

- Plato identifies *aretē* with a property that enables its possessor to serve its purpose effectively.
- So, Plato restricts *aretē* to a potentiality.
- In other words, Plato identifies *aretē* with potential purposiveness.

6. That hammer is good. [POTENTIAL GOODNESS]
7. That feels good. [EFFECTIVE GOODNESS]

- Plato also appears to restrict *aretē* statively; i.e., he appears to restrict *aretē* to a property of a state.

THREE SUPERORDINATE CLASSES OF GOODNESS (or VALUE)

MODAL CLASS	potential, effective, etc.
RELATIONAL CLASS	intrinsic, instrumental, conditional, etc.
DOMAINAL CLASS	moral, aesthetic, economic, technological, etc.

6. "*Aretē*" in Pre-Platonic Ethics

"The *aretē* of a public speaker is to tell the truth, and the *aretē* of a juror is make just judgments." (*Ap.* 18a3-6) [example of *aretē* as effective goodness in Plato]

- In ethical philosophy prior to Plato, "*aretē*" is generally not used to denote a property of the state of the soul; it is principally used to denote a property of an action or a pattern of action.

"The adornment (*kosmos*) of a city is manly valor, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom, of an action (*pragma*) goodness (*aretē*)." (Gorg. B11.1.1)

- How and why does *aretē* get potentialized, stativized, and psychologized in Plato?
- Eschatological and cosmological reason: Plato's occasional Pythagoreanism, the human being is essentially identifiable with his immortal soul.
- Political reason: Plato is concerned with the cultivation of citizens.
- In short, considered in terms of the lexical meaning of "*aretē*" as goodness, Plato's potential, stative psychologization of *aretē* involves a very specific determination of *aretē*, again: potential goodness of the state of the soul.

7. "*Aretē*" and "*Hexis*"

- Given Plato's potentiality restriction on it, to what ontological category does *aretē* belong?
- Plato: *aretē* belongs to the category *dynamis* (power or capacity.)
- Aristotle, *EN* 2.5: the *genus* of *aretē* is *hexis*.
- In *Gorgias* Plato first speaks of the soul as having a *hexis*. (524b4-c1)
- In *Cratylus* Plato first characterizes the *aretē* of the soul as a *hexis*. (415d4-6)
- Plato's use of "*hexis*" is a development of the Hippocratic medical use of "*hexis*."
- (*h*)*ech-* + *-sis* > *hexis*

[Instances of "*hexis*" in fifth to early fourth c. medicine: Hp. *Acut.* 35 Jones (= 9.59 Littré), 43 Jones (= 11.69 Littré); *Epid.* 1.9 Jones (= 1.2.4.108 Littré); *Off.* 3.33, 15.10; *Art.* 12.16; *Moch.* 40.37; *Vict.* 32.2, 81.22, 82.19, 89.4; *Mul.* 230.68.]

- The Hippocratics appear to have coined "*hexis*" to denote the condition of a patient, precisely a condition of the body.
- Plato extends the application from body to soul.
- In the Hippocratic texts, a *hexis* needn't be stable or perduring.
- In Plato, at least by the late dialogues, "*hexis*" appears to be used with a perdurance restriction.
- Aristotle adopts the perdurance restriction.
- Aristotle treats "*hexis*" as essentially value-laden.
- For Aristotle, *hexis* entails (i) perduring, (ii) value-laden, stative (iii) property that enables its possessor to perform well or ill.

9. "*Aretē*" and "*To Agathon*"

POINT ONE

- "*to agathon*" is not subjected to the same potentiality restriction as "*aretē*."
- "*to agathon*" is not used to denote virtue.

"*aretē*: the best condition (*diathesis*); a *hexis* of a mortal animal according to which it is praiseworthy. A *hexis* according to which that which possesses it is said to be good (*agathon*). A condition (*diathesis*), according to which that which possesses it is perfectly disposed (*diakeimenon teleiōs*) and said to be morally good (*spoudaion*); a *hexis* productive (*poiētikē*) of lawfulness." (Def. 411d1-4)

"*agathon*: that which exists for the sake of itself (*to hautou eneka*)." (Def. 413a3)

POINT TWO

- Plato thinks there is a more particular description of the property of the state that an entity has that makes that state good.

"Now, both we ourselves and everything else are good (*agathon*) because of some goodness (*aretē*) that is present to us (*paragenomenēs*)." (Grg. 506d2-4)

"But the goodness (*aretē*) of each thing – be it a piece of equipment, a body, a soul, or any animal – is most beautifully present to that thing not by accident (*tōi eikēi*), but because of some order (*taxei*) or correctness (*orthotēti*) or craft (*technēi*) that is allotted to each ... So then, the goodness (*aretē*) of each thing is its being organized (*tetagmenon*) and arranged (*kekosmēmenon*) according to some order (*taxei*) ... So, it is a certain appropriate arrangement (*kosmos*) present in each thing that makes each thing good (*agathon*)." (Grg. 506d5-e4)

"It is from things not agreed to possess the good that [Plato and his adherents] argue for the things agreed to be good. For example, they argue from numbers that justice and health are good, on the grounds that justice and health are orders (*taxeis*) and numbers – and assuming that goodness belongs to numbers and units because unity (*to hen*) is the good itself (*auto to agathon*)." (EE 1.8, 1218a16-21)

"[According to the Platonists,] unity itself (*auto to hen*) is the good itself (*to agathon auto*)." (Metaph. 14.4, 1091b14)

- Gorgias thesis: *aretē* = order (*taxis*) or arrangement (*kosmos*).
- Aristotelian attribution: *to agathon* = unity (*to hen*).
- Unity or order needn't be potential or stative.
- Unity or order does not entail goodness (or value).
- "Goodness" denotes a significant amount of value; "unity" and "order," if gradable at all, denote maximal amounts on their relevant scales.